The Importance of Religion and the Secular for Peace and War:Challenges For Scholars Seen In The Light Of The Edict Of Milan by Wilkes, George
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Importance of Religion and the Secular for Peace and War
Citation for published version:
Wilkes, G 2013, 'The Importance of Religion and the Secular for Peace and War: Challenges For Scholars
Seen In The Light Of The Edict Of Milan' Religija i Tolerancija, pp. 7-15.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher final version (usually the publisher pdf)
Published In:
Religija i Tolerancija
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Wilkes, G. (2013). The importance of religion and the secular for peace and war: Challenges For Scholars
Seen In The Light Of The Edict Of Milan. Religija i Tolerancija, 7-16.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
 George R. Wilkes,                                                      UDK: 316.74:2; 27-67:322;  
University of Edinburgh                                                       355.01:2 
Scotland, United Kingdom                                         Orginal scientific paper 
george.wilkes@ed.ac.uk                                             Received: 19.04.2013. 
 
 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION AND THE 
SECULAR FOR PEACE AND WAR: 
Challenges For Scholars Seen In The Light Of The 
Edict Of Milan 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Religion has come to be seen as one of the most common and powerful drivers of armed 
conflict. This article departs from a prominent portion of the existing academic literatu-
re in suggesting that the extensive influence of religion in conflicts cannot be seen pri-
marily as an isolated radicalising ideological force which works by defining the extre-
mity of the crisis at hand. Rather, it is argued, religion exercises much of its influence 
through practices which express the norms of institutions and communities experiencing 
conflict. It is for this reason, the essay concludes, that to some religious institutions can 
appear to define communal aspirations in a conflict, while to others there seems to be 
no necessary link between that conflict and the use of religious forms or the roles taken 
by religious actors.  
 
Key words: religion and war, secular and religious responses in armed conflict, Chris-
tianity and the State, evidence in the study of religion/non-religion.  
 
 
 
The Edict of Milan of February 313 remains a potent symbol wherever 
contemporary states seek to identify themselves as civilized by virtue of their 
respect for the freedom of religious minorities. The events surrounding the 
Edict of Milan continue to have an impact across the Christian world for ano-
ther, potentially more troubling reason. One year before the Edict, Constantine 
claimed the imperial title after a vision revealed to him that the Empire’s army 
must be led under a standard bearing the letters chi rho, the first two letters in 
Χριστός, Christ. Constantine subsequently won the Battle of the Milvian Bridge 
at the end of October 312, and this victory set the stage for the Edict of Milan, 
an edict designed to consolidate Constantine’s rule to the detriment of his rivals. 
In much popular Christian culture, this historical context is wholly 
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overshadowed by the most easily identified long-term consequence of this 
battle, the identification between Christianity and the military victories of the 
State.  
It is worth paying careful attention to the means by which the chi rho 
emblem has been translated into a basic feature of Christian and post-Christian 
national cultures around the world today. Through the medium of a Latin trans-
lation. Constantine’s use of the sign of Christ is widely known to Christians ac-
ross the world through later embellishments using the anagram IHS, standing 
both for ‘Jesus Christ the Saviour’ and equally for the phrase ‘In this sign’. Both 
military and political uses of the symbol commonly render it, relying on the La-
tin translation, as ‘In this sign conquer’, rather than the less imperative alter-
native translation, ‘In this sign you will conquer’. The first version, ‘In this sign 
conquer’, is more open to interpretation as an injunction to make war in the na-
me of religion, though it need not be interpreted in this fashion. The second ver-
sion suggests the spiritual power of Christianity as much as the will to conquest. 
However, it is the first version which is used in political institutions around the 
Western world, in spite of the shift from what was once a specifically Christian 
political culture to an increasing emphasis on a politics which is secular or mul-
tifaith. Thus, in the British army to this day, chaplains of all religious denomi-
nations wear a badge bearing the symbol of the Cross of Christ and Constan-
tine’s motto, ‘In This Sign Conquer’.  
It need therefore not surprise that the proximity of the Battle of Milvian 
Bridge and the Edict of Milan still resonates in contemporary reflection on the 
relationship between religion and conflict, and similarly in discourse about the 
relationship between ‘Religion’ and ‘State’. The academic literature on religion 
and violence encompasses a range of works which proceed from the assertion 
that the use of religion is natural in the State’s violence, and particularly in war-
time. This perspective is advanced by a range of writers, and is not necessarily 
associated with a common school of thought or political perspective. Religion is 
construed in this literature as both motivating and justifying violence, and reli-
gion is therefore as being implicated in it. Against this tendency, an alternative 
perspective divorces political abuses of religion from the true nature of religion, 
insisting that a religion need not be implicated in the political use of its symbols 
or argumentative tools. Again, there may be a range of reasons for which this 
perspective appeals, and there is no single school or ideology which dominates 
argument of this type. The present essay explores the grounds on which such 
broad intuitions about the relationship between religion and conflict can be exa-
mined in the light of hard evidence, empirically. We will make the case for un-
derstanding the two alternative approaches to apply more or less persuasively as 
a result of a decision about the nature of the violence imposed by a conflict: in 
the first case, conflict being perceived as a crisis changing the relationship bet-
ween religious and secular meanings, and in the second case the relationship bet-
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ween religion and the political realm being part of a complicated normality, not 
broken by the consequences of a given violent conflict. 
Today, a growing body of academic works has sought to cast light on 
the persistence of religion in conflict (for two influential examples, see Johnston 
1994 and Appleby 1999). There is still, nevertheless, much work to be done by 
academics in this field. There are, for instance, many features of contemporary 
military life which reflect a religious history about which little research has 
been published: the ‘baptism’ of officers, marked in secular France and Muslim 
Morocco with the adoption of a ‘godfather’ by each graduating class; the rituals 
associated with preparation for combat; the ‘baptism of fire’, the first contact 
with the enemy; the ‘mission’; the treatment of the dead, of prisoners, of allies 
through formal pacts; and of victories and of triumph. Secular uses of religion 
are part of military normality, and it would take a serious effort to understand 
the extent to which once religious practices such as these continue to operate as 
religious in the new contexts in which they continue to be used. 
Civilians also inherit a plethora of religious institutions associated with 
war – places and conditions for asylum, the rituals associated with peace negoti-
ations, and invocations associated with forgiveness and with an end to conflict. 
Civilian populations in many conflicts today mark deaths in wartime as sacred, 
often borrowing from secularized language about the nation state used by mo-
dern European philosophers such as Hegel. There is a long history behind this, 
such that it may be difficult to untangle why this language seems self-evident to 
the families of the fallen in Maoist Nepal, or in Leftist kibbutzim steeped in a 
non-theistic culture in Israel. Critics will view this as a common form of mani-
pulation of the population by a State or armed group, whose survival may de-
pend on persuading people that they may have to die in the defence of their po-
litical cause. And yet in both of these two cases governments and armies have 
found otherwise secular civilian populations insisting upon the sacred quality of 
the fallen, and on appropriate public funeral or memorial services, where poli-
tical leaders though to deem this inappropriate or inconvenient. The mélange of 
secular and religious is often more deeply entwined than will allow for simple 
manipulation. Neither politicians nor religious officials need to create a link for 
secular publics which already talk of the testimony or witness of the fallen, of 
citizens who have made the ultimate sacrifice, and whose deaths are justified in 
speeches about the values for which wars are fought: perhaps the highest human 
values, or values we hold sacred.  
The result is that, whether we are Serbian or French, Nepalese or Bur-
mese, Israeli or Palestinian, our experience of war is a complex combination of 
secular and religious, of profane and sacred. To study the complexities of this 
mixture of the secular and religion demands an expensive interdisciplinary col-
laboration, given that it entails both a careful examination of context and a so-
phisticated approach to normative fields which link divergent ideologies and 
social discourses, as we shall see further below. 
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The challenges of work which bridges careful contextual history or so-
ciological analysis with nuanced reflection on the normative dimensions of the 
use of religion in conflict can be illustrated through returning to the Edict of Mi-
lan. The intellectual resonance of the Edict in contemporary public and scholar-
ly debate is as much about broad intimations about the ideals we inherit from 
Constantine’s time as it is about careful contextual scholarship. The ideals of re-
ligious freedom and toleration lie close to the heart of our post-Constantinian ci-
vilization, indeed, this is part of our inheritance from the Greeks and Romans. 
War is treated as legitimate when fought in the name of our freedoms, and, fol-
lowing Constantine’s model, in making peace statesmen have given legal sub-
stance to the freedoms of minorities, religious and otherwise ever since that ti-
me, classically during the Wars of Religion of the fifteenth-seventeenth centu-
ries. To contest the link between freedom and the rights granted by state actions 
is to revisit one of the basic norms associated with the long development of 
Western civilization. Critics of this political tradition have lamented the ap-
parent unification of religion and state under Constantine since the Wars of Re-
ligion, particularly because it involved a union of Christianity and military po-
wer. In the Anglo-American world, the anti-Statist critique that was once identi-
fied with radical Anabaptists and other historic peace churches has become po-
pular amongst liberal Protestants of other denominations. Thanks in particular 
to the influential work of the Mennonite scholar John Howard Yoder (see, e.g. 
Yoder 1996, 65), ‘the Constantinian shift’, the joining of Church and State, has 
been increasingly commonly construed as the basic civilizational flaw which le-
ads traditional Christians into support for state violence. The call for a post-
Constantinian revolution is also made in some liberal Jewish circles, borrowing 
the argument made by liberal Christians such as James Carroll that it was the 
political, imperial Church which created the conditions for two millennia of an-
ti-Jewish teaching and discrimination in Europe, tolerating small Jewish mino-
rities while also teaching contempt, enmity or hatred for them (Carroll 2001). In 
these circles, Constantinian Christianity is not seen as a benevolent guarantor of 
religious freedom for all, but as the militant Church forged by Constantine be-
fore the Battle of Milvia in 312, tolerating official Christianity but hostile to in-
dependent Christianities and to Judaism.  
This historical background is part and parcel of the field into which mo-
re careful empirical scholarship about the relationship between religion and 
conflict, or between religion and peace, is demanded. There may therefore be 
enormous gains to be made from questioning the terms in which such sweeping 
generalisations about the marriage of state and church are made. The terrain is 
difficult to generalize about in part because of the types of evidence most readi-
ly available, in part because the importance of that evidence as a guide to under-
standing how religion motivates conflict or peace-making activities is open to 
multiple interpretations. Thus, while there are scholars for whom events of 312 
and 313 established a basis for intolerant power, other scholars have instead 
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identified the determining factor in the growth of restrictions on Jewish com-
munities, for instance, in the long contest within imperial structures in the cen-
turies that followed over the appropriate degree of tolerance for religious diver-
sity. In spite of legal restrictions on the building of synagogues, for instance, sy-
nagogues were built. Thus, while public sources proclaim restrictions on Jews 
and on minority Christian groups, the archeological record shows that in many 
locations these restrictions were often only partly or gradually enforced in prac-
tice over the 150 or 200 years to come (see, e.g., Gray, 1993, 262-63). Here is a 
divergence found many times in empirical work on religion and conflict, and 
the value of a careful empirical study can easily be seen in this case: The situ-
ation became increasingly insecure for these minorities, but the persecutions 
they came to experience were not solely the product of Constantine’s decision 
to create a Christian empire, they also relied on social and political develop-
ments over the centuries to come. In this archetypal case for the study of the im-
pact of religion and conflict on the Western state, a careful scholarship is ap-
propriate, even necessary, given that the published record does not tell the 
whole story: it is not possible to fully comprehend the relationship between reli-
gion and public life through the documents of the imperial institutions.  
Scholars seeking to understand the role of religion in conflict today face 
a parallel situation. Media accounts in many contemporary conflicts make clear 
how political extremists have made capital out of inter-religious difference, and 
the public proximity of religious officials to political power provides a context 
in which it is natural to assume that religion is a key driver for conflict. More 
careful study would be needed in order to ascertain the attitude of religious fi-
gures and of the communities they work in, and there is surprisingly little aca-
demic literature at present which tackles this with any deliberate methodo-
logical rigour. Thus, at present, much literature infers the attitude of religious 
functionaries or leaders by their silences, by what they did not do, or by the in-
terpretation we give to their conformity. If this falls foul of a general argumen-
tative trap, attempting to argue from silence, this also presents challenges pecu-
liar to the study of religions and of other group cultures, which the academic li-
terature focused on problems in the study of religion describes in terms of ‘insi-
der’ and ‘outsider’ perspectives. Some of the most controversial phenomenon 
cited in favour of the case for the implication of religion in state violence – in 
the case of the conflicts of the 1990s in the Former Yugoslav, for instance, the 
literature highlights controversies associated with the blessing of troops, the 
construction of religious symbols, and of religious buildings (e.g. Perica 2004, 
Sells 1996) – cannot be evaluated with any sensitivity without understanding 
the factors which lead to different ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ understandings. 
Nevertheless, from an outsider perspective, insofar as these acts relate 
to a political conflict, they can communicate that conflict, some will say that the 
religious-political connection is sufficient to communicate that conflict. Even 
given the right of insiders to guard their own traditions by right, as soon as reli-
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gions are associated with conflict, the establishment of rights or freedoms for 
one religious community may imply political obstacles for other religions. This 
provides three levels to any study of a conflict involving religious elements: the 
understandings of outsiders, those of insiders, and those relationships between 
insiders and outsiders which contribute to conflict. In some conflicts, as with 
the competing perspectives amongst Poles and Jews over commemorative sym-
bols at Auschwitz (Zubrzycki 2006), this complexity is understood better. The 
scholarship on the controversies over religion and memorial practices at Ausch-
witz shows what advantages derive from building scholarly networks crossing 
communities, committed to understanding and communicating diverse perspec-
tives without giving up on more careful critical reflection on the factors in the 
genesis of those perspectives. Since a confusion between religious normality 
and political conflict may make for an even more dangerous mix, more acade-
mic sophistication is not the same as naïve or uncritical positivism. 
With respect to other conflicts, by contrast, a stronger body of literature 
treats the use of religious symbols in public spaces with ethnically mixed popu-
lations as deliberate and inevitable political provocation. This is true of much of 
the best literature on religion in the war and post-war periods in the former Yu-
goslavia (Perica 2004, Sells 1996, Velikonja 2003). In this literature, the real 
world impact of the cross is considered primarily in terms of its function as an 
ethnic symbol, a sign of unity within one group and division, confrontation and 
provocation across faith communities. In Vukovar, in Mostar, in Stolac, the 
planting of prominent public crosses responds to more than conflict with other 
national groups, it also communicates a message regarding conflict over the se-
cular State, and over conflicting attitudes towards religion and the public sphere 
within the ‘insider’ national community, itself divided by practices of com-
munication and non-communication. Setting these relationships in a political 
context is sensitive, since there are multiple political contexts into which the act 
of cross planting may fit. This complexity similarly marks the blessing of a reli-
gious figure on the institutions of a state or a political party, or a religious of-
ficial’s blessing of troops before a military mission, though these can easily be 
read as straightforward indications of religious support for political and military 
conflict and extremism. An insider perspective may appear strikingly different. 
Firstly, because these blessings appear – without regard to the nature of ongoing 
conflicts – a part of normal religious life. Religious blessings over troops follow 
formulas, and in many communities a representative of a religious community 
is not morally or practically free to refuse to perform such a blessing. Outsiders 
reasonably link a blessing of troops to moral approval for their actions, while – 
a subject crying out for historical scholarship – a church’s traditions may 
wholly disregard the moral consequences of blessing a soldier before they go 
out to kill or be killed. Of course, a priest’s or a rabbi’s or an imam’s speech or 
behaviour can indicate a more than perfunctory support for soldiers in a conflict 
should they choose this, but understanding what is more than required by duty 
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can be extremely tricky. Secondly, for insiders, these actions are viewed in rela-
tion to a national community’s internal divisions over the role of religion and 
secularity in political life. In that light, the vociferous exhortation of a religious 
figure at election time may appear to some a sign of established political stren-
gth and ideological conviction, to others a sign of real political weakness and 
insecurity. The challenge for interpreting these acts is normally heightened by 
the fact that few representatives of religious communities provide evidence of 
their intention, or make public their assessment of the significance of competing 
contexts for their actions.  
In conclusion, this essay presents a distinction between a balanced ref-
lection on all three of the dimensions of an act which has religious and political 
connotations, on the one hand, and, on the other, the kind of critical account 
which makes more sweeping and a priori assumptions about the radicalizing 
function of religion in conflict. If this is accepted, then it will be clear that an 
account of religion and war based solely on Constantine’s legacy is not enough. 
The balanced scholar cannot simply infer a negative lesson, for instance, from 
the proximity of the Battle of Milvia and the Edict of Milan, in line with the cri-
tical account of those like Yoder who note that religion and political power 
when mixed lead to killing and to war. These critiques are not without per-
suasive force and analytical value, as long as this can be properly set in context. 
Yoder’s conviction that it is possible to wholly separate religion and politics ne-
ed not be accepted to see the value of his point that apolitical religious acts are 
themselves political. Clearly balance and sensitivity are not the only criteria at 
stake here. After so much blood has been shed with the blessing of religious fi-
gures and institutions, who cannot be sympathetic with the critical outsider voi-
ce, even as it assumes that insider perspectives do not vary significantly, or that 
such variety does not matter; that the relationships established through an armed 
conflict can become the primary point of reference for a discussion of the sys-
tem of rights and responsibilities which must end that conflict.  
But there is also a further ground on which the outsider can press a cri-
tical perspective on the naivety of the insider who interprets religious institu-
tions without regard for their apparent political meanings. The insider cannot 
justly ignore the existence and the natural need for security of the religious and 
non-religious others alongside whom they live. There is in this perspective no 
religious act which is not a political act insofar as it creates or affects a relation-
ship to the other. Understand where Yoder and other critiques of the deploy-
ment of religion in a conflict are coming from: for most, the conflict constitutes 
a crisis, within which there is no act which does not proceed from that crisis. In 
this crisis, there is no sense in which religious acts can be viewed as normal, un-
related to the politics of the conflict which imposes itself on all people and on 
all of their acts. Insofar as it speaks to a human level, this critical perspective 
has persuasive power. From this perspective, the act of religious exclusion is the 
beginning of war, not the first gunfire; and the act of religious inclusion is the 
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necessary conclusion to a political suit for peace. This was the lesson repeatedly 
drawn during the European wars of religion. In other words, in this view, reli-
gious relationships must be resolved at Milan if there has been a battle at Mil-
via. Nevertheless, empirically it may be observed that many people separate 
between a political crisis and the norms and normal meanings associated with 
religious acts. So, for instance, in Israel and Palestine: people who have decided 
that their community is in crisis will disagree about the significance of religious 
continuities, as they disagree about other social continuities. If we are to accept 
that conflict provides a sense of crisis alongside a sense of the normal, then the 
careful examination of multiple social or political relationships is a more per-
suasive framework for understanding a conflict and its consequences than is 
provided by the popular and academic works which assume that the role of reli-
gion in conflict must either be dangerous or wholly removed from the political 
realm. In this framework, the voice of the critic will not be silenced, but refined. 
Empirically, context and nuance will then make a difference to the relationship 
between religion and conflict, but the empirical process takes place within the 
challenging environment in which all aspects of life in modern armed conflicts 
can be seen to be subject to crisis, in which balance and nuance alone represent 
inadequate resources for the engaged observer.  
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VAŽNOST RELIGIJE I SEKULARNOSTI U POGLEDU RATA I MIRA 
Izazovi akademicima u svetlu Milanskog edikta 
 
Apstrakt 
 
Religija se danas posmatra kao jedan od najuobičajenijih i najsnažnjih motiva za 
oružane sukobe. Ovaj članak se odvaja od istaknutog dela postojeće akademske 
literature u smislu da sugeriše kako se znatan uticaj religije u sukobima ne može 
primarno posmatrati kao izolovana radikalistička ideološka sila koja deluje tako što 
definiše krajnosti date krize. Naprotiv, tvrdi se da religija ima znatan uticaj kroz praksu 
koja izražava norme institucija i zajednica koje su u sukobu. Iz tog razloga esej 
zaključuje da neke verske ustanove mogu da pokušaju da definišu težnje zajednice ka 
sukobu, dok druge ne uviđaju nužnu vezu između sukoba i upotrebe verskih oblika ili 
uloga koje na sebe preuzimaju verski činioci. 
 
Ključne reči: religija i rat, sekularna i verska reakcija na oružani sukob, hrišćanstvo i 
država, dokazi u studijama religije i nereligijskih aspekata. 
